An Argument for Externalism 1 (Wilhelm Vossenkuhl) There is plenty of evidence, e.g. in mathematics, in the sciences, and in economics, that rationality is paramount to all other cognitive powers. There is further evidence that intentions are borne and originate in the mind. We therefore might be inclined to conclude that rational intentions are brought about in the mind internally by the best of all cognitive powers. In this case it would be enough to analyse mental representations which are antecedent to decision making in order to find the basic ingredients causing rational or irrational intentions. But there is neither evidence for representations of this sort nor for mental causes of rational intentions. It is true that intending is a mental state or act, but it would, indeed, be false to believe that intentions are produced or brought about internally, i.e., without reference to the external world. argue, actions may be intentional even if they do not result from deliberate choice. I therefore need not tackle the belief-desire-model myself.
Volitional attitudes and external meanings
It is not obvious why volitional attitudes, like, e.g., intending or wanting, should have external meanings. It is textbook knowledge that these attitudes are akin to other forms of intentionality or intentional states like, e.g., believing, or perceiving. As a common feature intentional states are directed to some objects 5 knowing that somebody else already did. From a subjective point of view the external meanings of volitional attitudes are not constitutive to these attitudes as they stand. In other words, the objects or contents which give meaning to these attitudes are -at least from the viewpoint of the person who entertains these attitudes -not yet existing. If I intend, or want to feel pleasure or are in fear of pain, it's not the actual pleasure I'm intending or wanting, and not the existing pain I fear but future pleasure and future pain, respectively. 6 Volitional attitudes are in general directed to the future, while cognitive attitudes are to all tenses. In terms of tenses there is even a slight difference within the family of volitional attitudes. I may, e.g., have always wished or wanted that some event never occurred but it wouldn't make sense to intend that something in the past was or was not the case. 7 Wittgenstein's famous note in his Tractatus (6.373), that the world is independent from my own will, is true at least for the past.
Intending and choosing spontaneously
The cognitive function of all intentional states may be described as the mental capacity to choose or select objects of knowledge, volition, and action without reflection. 'Choice without reflection' sounds awkward and paradoxical. But we do, indeed, direct our attention to contents or things without consciously considering alternatives. Without being able to offer a reason why we, e.g., turned our attention to this person rather than that one we choose objects of seeing, thinking, wanting, and intending without knowing why in the moment we Both these connotations merge in one and the same kind of example: E.g., my spontaneous intention to go to the cinema after my friend told me she couldn't make our date for dinner this evening. May be I am disappointed and angry, may be not; may be I just heard good news about the movie before, may be not. My intention is still spontaneous, independent from whether I could have chosen something else. Probably, after deep and thorough psychological scrutiny it will become obvious that there are bundles of causal chains which explain why I chose the intention to go to the cinema as against the theatre or staying home.
Subjectively, my choice will still remain as having been taken spontaneously. It is not causally determined by earlier choices of the same or of a similar kind and it is not taken after reasoning or deliberation. This leaves enough room for long term intentions, emotions, aesthetic attitudes, and tastes to influence spontaneous mental choices of intentions and wants.
These are some of the stronger candidates for the bundles of causal chains which might in the end explain my spontaneous choice of intentions.
Mental choice
I introduced the notion of 'mental choice' claiming that it is the capacity of intentional states to choose their own objects and thereby their contents. The exercise of this cognitive function is far from clear. We are, at least conceptually, at a loss to explain in detail the faculty of directing and guiding ones perceptual and cognitive attention to whatever available contents of intending. We therefore, gladly, take it that these contents individuate what we intend. But, of course, in order to avoid circular explanations, we shall not hold that these contents will direct our attention externally. Otherwise, the intentional contents would cause their respective intentions backwards, as it were.
To direct ones attention to an object rather seems to be a process of mutual fit in which an individual's attention and the special features or even attractions of an object merge nicely.
It looks as if the direction of ones attention is a co-operative mixture of active and passive between a subject and an object. On the background of a subject's pro-attitudes, including emotional dispositions, likings and dislikings, one and the same object seems appealing at a time but not at another one. In the latter case the person will not even take notice of it. If I like walking and if I want to take a break, going for a walk may seem appealing. But I may not even think of talking a walk although I'm taking a break. This active-passive interplay is a
simple picture of what is going on when we intend to do, say, or know something.
We choose -as I argue above -many of our intentions to do something spontaneously without being knowingly or consciously determined or caused by earlier mental choices of the same or of a similar kind. It would, e.g., not make sense to say that I now intend to go for a walk because I had the same intention before. But the relation between intentions, actions, and habits is tricky. Although habits and actions following a rule are repetitive they are still intentional activities. They express what someone is up to, i.e., his or her intention-in-action.
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The tricky bit is that the expression of intention of each action-token is in a way guaranteed by the action-type. A certain action-type or habit is known to express a respective intentionin-action. If I use the common words and gestures to greet people my behaviour will be identified as greeting independent from further intentions of mine.
Nevertheless, habits do not cause but represent and express intentions. My habit of greeting people is not the cause of my greeting Paul or Luisa. I don't greet everybody. Habits need some training and if they are well trained they become long term attitudes which we are prone to follow. In so far habits make it easy to choose affiliated and conventionally used actions. But action-types or habits will not cause action-tokens. The further are necessary in order to identify but not sufficient to execute the respective action-tokens. are not sufficient to explain the choice consciously taken.
Rationality and rational choice
Like intentionality, rationality too has a functional meaning. It's, again, a cognitive function which resembles the type of mental choice just described for intentional states. But while the mental choice of intentions is generally spontaneous, the degree of spontaneity in rational choice is to be clarified. Some differencies between mental and rational choice seem to be obvious. As against mental choice, the choice we perform rationally -so it seems -is caused by conscious motives and explained by deliberate reasons. If it is following deliberation and reasoning the rationality of choice is taken in a wide sense implying noninstrumental aims and purposes like, e.g., self-respect or social justice. 12 Rationality in the 11 The causally undetermined role of a person's intention in action is analysed by Miss Anscombe (loc.cit., 34-37). 12 Rationality in the wide sense implies a number of models like, e.g., expressive rationality, and bounded rationality. wide sense is often used as a synonym for 'reason'. As I mentioned above, deliberation and reasoning does not obviate spontaneity.
In a narrow sense rationality in terms of rational choice has an instrumental meaning.
This type of choice is based on motives of gain relative to some purposes or aims. It seems that these motives make choices successful by making decisions clear and predictable. In its latter sense, the rationality of individual behaviour is unanimously defined by the axioms which determine the maximisation of expected utility. 13 Nobody will deny the importance of rationality in the wide sense, nor will anybody ignore that the model of rational choice offers a clear and useful normative model of individual decision making under certainty, risk, and uncertainty. Under certainty every agent knows exactly the utilities of his action. Under risk or uncertainty utilities are gauged by probabilities. The Bayesian rule tells the agent to maximise his subjectively expected utilities. 14 Every rational agent behaves as if he is motivated by the maximisation of expected utility. The theory of choice tells us how the agent realises his motive rationally, i.e., with the utmost success relative to some intended aim.
There is no need to go into the details of expected utility theory. Thinking about rational intentions it will be enough to recall two of the major features of rational choice: first, its psychological groundwork, and, second, its axiomatic structure. The psychological groundwork is more or less expressed by the motivational force of expected utility maximisation. Francis Edgeworth's famous conjecture -in his Mathematical Psychics (1881)
-that all individuals are driven by their pursuit of gain is a possible but not wholly adequate descriptions of the psychological nature of this very motive. It must not necessarily be the case that in rational decision making I am intending to get more of a certain good for myself.
It's not greed which motivates my decision but the optimum of outcomes relative to certain aims independent from their egotistic or altruistic nature. Why humans want to take successful decisions is imbedded in their psychological groundwork and may remain opaque. What they want to be successful in is made transparent by the rational decisions themselves. This is how human psychology and mathematical axioms are co-ordinated. On top of the psychological groundwork a small number of axioms tell us how rationality works in order to maximise expected utility. With the axiomatic layer rational action and social exchange in general is modelled on economic action. Edgeworth described the economy as a bazaar, "an arena in 13 For the sets of axioms for rational choice under certainty and one for rational choice under uncertainty see S.Hargreaves Heap, M.Hollis, B.Lyons, R.Sugden, A.Weale, The Theory of Choice, Oxford: Blackwell 1992, 5-11. 14 The Bayesian rule contains a subjective probability function and a subjective utility function. Both these functions come down to the value of expected utility.
which everyone is free to haggle with everyone else." 15 I won't pursue Edgeworth's economic ideas here. But the way he gives pure exchange economy a mathematical face makes it obvious how rationality ascends from the psychological and motivational groundwork via the mathematical structure of exchange to the maximisation of expected utility. There is no doubt, rationality in the narrow sense has psychological roots. At least in theory, it originates from non-rational dispositions. But these dispositions do not explain the decisions people take. The theory explains their rationality externally on basis of the pay-offs they gain.
Rational paradox and the contexts of choice
Historically, we may now remember Hume's notorious plea for the passions as being the masters of reason. But I don't think that this piece of history is of any help if we want to understand rational intentions. What we learn from expected utility theory -if we want to -is that the psychology at the bottom of the theory will never carry us anywhere near rational choice on its own. The problem is that non-rational dispositions and motives are blind and clueless without the theoretical scaffolding which is offered by expected utility theory.
Therefore no Humean internalist will be able to explain the rationality or irrationality of choices. On the other hand expected utility theory is empty and inefficient without the motivational force from some psychological groundwork. It is difficult to explain how motives become forceful without cognitive guidance. One may, of course, try Hume again that the passions press reason into slavery and make them willynilly develop the theory needed. Instrumentalism is definitely not void of plausibility. As long as my motives are strong enough I'll do anything I can to realise my intentions; this is the message of instrumentalism. But, as we know from the sub-optimal results of non-cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma, the dictates of the passions will not guarantee maximal success not even with theoretical help. Too easily rationality turns into irrationality.
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Obviously, the fit between the psychological groundwork and the instruments offered by decision theory to reach success is not quite happy. And I am not trying to improve it. I am rather interested in the incongruency itself and what we learn from it. It tells us, first, that we cannot generally proceed from the mental or psychological origin of intentions to rational outcomes even if we know what we should do to behave rationally in terms of the theory. It tells us, further, that our preferences do not agree with those norms of rationality that the standard theory prescribes. The axiomatic structure of the theory seems to be unable to account for what very many of us take to be the most rational thing to do. The story I have in mind is the Allais Paradox.
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The French economist M. Allais published a paper in which he criticised some of the axioms of expected utility theory. 18 His idea was to argue that people choose contrary to some of the assumptions made by the standard theory. 19 In order to show this Allais offered two problems which are described by the following lists. The pay-offs on these lists are in money in whatever currency: It seems unreasonable to take the risk of getting nothing for a relatively small increase. Most people will therefore reason that it seems preferable to be on the safe side and choose B instead of A. In problem 2 C looks a bit riskier than D, but here it seems reasonable to take the higher risk for the larger pay-off.
Why should these choices be paradoxical? The paradox is due to expected utility It should be easy to correct expected utility theory if it doesn't suit human behaviour.
We could, e.g., delete or modify the axiom of independence, as it seems to be too demanding. easily explained: If we choose A and E occurs our regret will be considerably deeper with option C than without. Of course, it all depends on the negligibility of e. Nevertheless, the change of preferences is brought about externally by a contextual change.
22 Robert Sugden, "An Axiomatic Foundation for Regret Theory", Journal of Economic Theory 60 (1993), 159-180. 23 p(E)=0,1 reads: the probability that E occurs is 0,1.
I shall neither discuss the general consequences of weakening the axiom of transitivity nor shall I defend Sugden's Regret Theory. His theory plausibly and convincingly shows that the alternatives of choice are not to be characterised by some intrinsic features of the alternatives themselves but by their mutual relations. These relations change relative to the contexts in which the alternatives of choice are offered. Finally, whenever these contexts change our preferences change as well.
The incongruency which I mentioned earlier between the psychological groundwork of decision making and the standard theory of rational choice is partly overcome by the different strategies of either weakening the axiom of transitivity or giving up the axiom of independence. In both cases the norms of rationality are adjusted to the possible changes of individual preferences. It is now possible to proceed without paradox from the psychological groundwork of decision making to the revised standards of rationality. Whatever revision of the set of axioms of the standard theory of rationality we accept the very possibility of revising the set corroborates the externalist account of rational decision making.
After all, both the analyses of mental and of rational choice showed that intentions are individuated by external meanings. While this issues from the spontaneity of mental choice in volitional attitudes it is due to the contextual character of preferences in rational choice. It first seemed that rational choice was not spontaneous but governed by the single motive to maximise expected utility. The advantage of the single motive seemed to be that it makes decisions clear and predictable, and that it guarantees maximal success. If this was the case rational choice would be determined internally by an intrinsic motive of gain. We now see that this is not the case. Obviously rational decision making is influenced by external factors to be found in its context. And these factors are beyond the control of the standard theory of choice. Each individual's psychological groundwork including character, emotions and evaluative attitudes play a role. 24 This is not surprising but it shows how inept the internalist Humean picture of the passions pressing reason into slavery is, at least from the view-point of rational decision making. The passions are too clueless and changeable to control reason. On the other hand, reason is unable to control the passions to the same effect.
Finally, rational choice can be as spontaneous as the mental choice of intentions. Even if we assume that we all share similar motives the choices we make are not caused by these motives directly. We choose our intentions to maximise our expected utilities basically the same way as we choose intentions mentally, i.e., independent from the clues and fixations which might have accrued from earlier choices.
At the beginning I mention the hybrid nature of rationality. Rationality is at least in its narrow, instrumental sense a hybrid. It is partly based on some psychological groundwork or motivational set and partly on theoretical and axiomatic structure. None of these parts is sufficient for rational decision making, and their relation is -as we learnt from Allais and Sugden -precarious. Why is rationality a hybrid? Because it combines two incongruent ingredients, psychological groundwork and theoretical structure. The mutual influence of these counterparts to form a coherent whole is ad hoc and a matter of compromise.
In order to determine the rationality of intentions we need to know their objects in a context of alternatives. Neither the psychological groundwork nor the theoretical structure of the standard theory offer a universal and conclusive basis to judge whether intentions are rational or not. Rational intentions are determined externally. No intention is intrinsically rational. The consequences of this observation in ethics are to be considered carefully at least for theories which are based on the intrinsic nature of moral rationality.
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25 The most prominent example is I. Kant who in his Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals argues from the intrinsic goodness and moral rationality of the "good will".
